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DE TOCQUEVILLE AND THE ROLE
OF THE LAWYER IN SOCIETY
PHIL C. NEA*
In keeping with the general theme of these lectures, your officers
have asked me to discuss the role of the lawyer in society in the
light of De Tocqueville's appraisal. I hope that I can give more
than glancing respect to our assigned text. But I also hope it will
be permissible if I interpret my invitation according to its spirit
rather than its letter, and pose some questions about the role of
the lawyer that are not directly suggested by De Tocqueville's
opinions. The spirit of this lecture series, I take it, is that we should
try to see our work as law students and as lawyers in a broader
perspective and context than our daily close grappling with legal
problems permits. That the students at Marquette Law School
should initiate a lecture series with such an aim is itself evidence
of a breadth of outlook here on which you should congratulate
yourselves and your Student Bar Association.
Whatever its relevance to our own day, De Tocqueville's picture
of the legal profession in America can hardly enable us to see its
functions fully and accurately, still less to appraise its contribution to the fabric of society. For his was a narrow and partial view.
To say this is not to criticize De Tocqueville nor to deny the panoramic perspective that he achieved in his work as a whole. His
interest in lawyers was incidental to a larger theme. We must
remember what that theme was.
For De Tocqueville the dominant fact of his time was a social
revolution that he regarded as certain to continue into the foreseeable future. He saw about him irresistable forces leading everywhere toward the equality of men. America attracted his interest as
the society in which this revolution was most advanced and which
at the same time had adjusted most successfully to its stresses. He
sought to learn the causes of this success, to understand the tendencies of the American system, and to speculate about its probable
future.
Despite his unconcealed admiration for democracy in America,
De Tocqueville's appraisal was heavy with misgivings for the future.
His discussion of the legal profession was an outgrowth of one of
the sources of his pessimism. In a chapter on "The Unlimited
Power of the Majority" he had advanced the view that the main
evil of democratic institutions in America was not in their weak* Dean, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. (summa cum laude), Harvard,
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ness, as was often asserted, but in their irresistable strength. He
professed to be alarmed by the inadequate securities against tyranny
he found here. This led him in the succeeding chapter-the chapter
that is our immediate concern-to examine the "Causes Which
Mitigate the Tyranny of the Majority." It is disconcerting to find
that De Tocqueville could enumerate but three such countervailing
forces against the tyranny he feared. The first was the institution
of trial by jury; the third was the limited power of the central
government; and the second was the legal profession itself.
Would De Tocqueville find confirmation of his views in the
present condition of the United States? He would be compelled to
conclude that the influence of lawyers in the public business has
kept pace with the growth of government itself. It is true that he
might wonder whether lawyers have recently been yielding some
of their ubiquitous role in policy-making to economists, computer
programmers, and other kinds of specialists. Whether he would
judge that the net influence of lawyers over the last century or in
more recent times has worked in the direction he imagined seems
hard to say. We would have to assume, first, that he would agree
that the excesses of democracy have been avoided. De Tocqueville
was obscure as to what those excesses might be, but we can reasonably take for granted that he would admire the stable and prosperous society America has continued to develop along with the egalitarian revolution. He would no doubt give heavy credit for this
condition to major economic, political and social reforms brought
about by law and this, in turn, might lead him to renewed emphasis on the value of lawyers in the American development.
But it would distort the role of lawyers in this development to
see them as a conservative and resistant force. One might as readily,
perhaps more readily, assert that lawyers have been a primary
source of innovation and change in American public law. From De
Tocqueville's point of view the question would be, perhaps, whether
the reforms in which lawyers have participated have been the
means of moderating radical forces and averting violent, unstabilizing change. In this sense all reform short of revolution may be
said to be conservative. Except in this sense, it seems difficult to
say that either conservative or progressive tendencies have predominated in the contribution of lawyers to contemporary American society. They have been on both sides, and in the thick of the
battle, at most of the points of contest, from the brain-trust days
of the New Deal to the great constitutional revisions of the Warren
Court.
In one respect, however, De Tocqueville's thesis has clearly
been confirmed. It was an exaggeration in his own time to say that
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"Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." It is still not
entirely true, but it is probably nearer the truth today than when
De Tocqueville wrote. The relaxation of such doctrines as standing,
ripeness, and political questions has permitted the Supreme Court
to become an ultimate arbiter on issues that might earlier have had
to find political resolution.
De Tocqueville was a strong believer in judicial review. It was
mainly through the institution of judicial review of legislative action that he expected the restraining influence of lawyers to be
exerted. On this ground he should be expected to endorse the recent
resurgence of what the Court's critics have called judicial activism.
But he would of course find trends in constitutional decision that
would pose hard problems for this general analysis. Given his preference for decentralized administration he could hardly take much
comfort in the astuteness with which the Supreme Court has manipulated doctrine to provide underpinnings for an expanding federal
power. In view of his professed fear of majority rule, it would very
likely give him pause to note the role of the courts in the reconstitution of our political processes under the one-man, one-vote
principle. As one who saw the problem of the Negro as the greatest
shadow on America's future, he would doubtless be gratified by
the enormous contribution of the courts toward giving the Negro
full status in our society. But he would suffer some discomfort, one
surmises, in adjusting his view of the courts and the legal profession to the broad egalitarian tendencies in recent readings of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It would be highly interesting to him,
surely, to discover that enthusiasm for judicial power has become
the liberal rather than the conservative position.
It is fascinating to speculate about where De Tocqueville would
stand on some of these questions and how he would revise his estimate of the influence of lawyers and courts. We may be sure that
he would not be confounded by what he saw. For De Tocqueville
had the lawyerlike virtue of avoiding oversimplification. He saw
tendencies and countertendencies everywhere and was quick to
note the possibilities that might upset his prophecies. It seems unlikely that his belief in a strong judiciary would be daunted by
particular decisions or trends of which he disapproved. He accepted judicial review as a political function, with all its dangers.
The judges, he said, "must be statesmen, wise to discern the signs
of the times, not afraid to brave the obstacles that can be subdued,
nor slow to turn away from the current when it threatens to sweep
them off." There is welcome defense here for one of the currently
contending schools of thought about the role of the Supreme Court.
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But those who embrace it should also be prepared to quote De
Tocqueville's warning: "The President, who exercises a limited
power, may err without causing great mischief in the state. Congress may decide amiss without destroying the Union, because
But
the electoral body ... may cause it to retract its decision ....
if the Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent or bad men,
the Union may be plunged into anarchy or civil war."
Whether we agree or disagree with De Tocqueville's evaluation
of the conservative influence of lawyers, we can hardly accept it
as a full account of the value of lawyers in our society. If we wish
to form our own estimate we must consider in more detail than he
did the variety of functions lawyers perform and make a fresh
appraisal of the utility of those functions in a good society. The
problem could be put in various ways. What judgment can be
made about the quality of a society by the proportion of human
effort devoted to lawyers' work? If we had more power than we
do to control the allocation of talent, would we channel more of it
or less of it into the legal profession? Perhaps we have reasonably
clear ideas about some other professions, such as teachers and
physicians, but how deep are our convictions about the social utility
of lawyers?
Of course we do not have much power to decide such questions
and it is probably fortunate that we do not. Still, the questions are
not altogether academic. Subsidies to higher education play an increasing role in determining who is to get graduate training and
in what fields. Again, we are presently confronted with the question
of priorities in a peculiarly painful form as we wrestle with the
problem of a rational scheme of selective service. The "war on
poverty" presents us with another instance in which decisions
about the use of resources may be made that will influence the
availability of lawyers. We do stand in need of some reasoned
judgment about the contribution our profession can make to the
general welfare.
The attempt to form such a judgment will make us see, I think,
that the social role of lawyers is many-sided and it will lead us to
distinguish different functions on which we may wish to place
different values. I should like to suggest four such functions or
four different spheres in which, it may be argued, lawyers make
their contribution to the general welfare. As to the relative values
of these functions and whether the importance of each is growing
or declining, I shall not have much to say. My interest is in encouraging you to believe that these are questions worth reflecting
upon and debating, and that they are susceptible of analysis.
First, then, there is what might be called the instrumental aspect of
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the lawyer's role. The lawyer is a man who executes someone else's
purposes, usually purposes that involve making arrangements with
others. On a table of organization of society viewed as a going concern, lawyers would appear as criss-crossing lines, filling the interstices and making a fabric of the whole. Perhaps this metaphor
suggests the indispensability of lawyers; perhaps that is why I
have used it. But it is obviously inaccurate to suggest that lawyers
are always essential to carrying out men's plans, even where those
plans necessarily involve creating or changing legal relationships
with others. Men can deal with each other directly or they can use
other kinds of representatives. The real estate contract is an obvious example. The supreme court of Illinois has recently decided
that it is lawful for real estate agents to effectuate binding contracts without the intervention of a lawyer. (Somewhat oddly, however, what they may not do is fill in the deed after the contract has
been made.)
Nor do I mean to suggest that lawyers in their instrumental
capacity are mere mechanics or servants. They are called upon to
shape and clarify the purposes of those whom they serve, and sometimes to refuse to execute a given purpose. Indeed, their willingness
to assume such responsibilities may be one clue to the fact that
lawyers in America more than elsewhere have come to play the
role of all-purpose social engineers, of roving experts in getting
things done.
It would be interesting to have some measure of the effect that
technological change and the general advance of knowledge are
having upon this aspect of the lawyer's function. Since the lawyer's
strength is in part his ability to function as a generalist, one might
expect to see his gradual displacement by more specialized experts
as knowledge in all fields becomes ever more refined and specialized.
Whether lawyers can maintain their versatility and continue to
command confidence as coordinators of the knowledge and efforts
of others is perhaps one of the central questions facing legal education and our profession. On the other hand, perhaps the increasing complexity of our society is in itself assurance that lawyers
have a future. From the viewpoint of self-interest, at least, there
may be some comfort in the thought that lawyers tend to beget
lawyers. The clearest evidence that a man needs a lawyer in a
transaction may be the fact that there is a lawyer on the other side.
Yet this is surely not the whole explanation of the importance of
lawyers in getting things done. Officials of our overseas aid programs, for example, tell us that a major obstacle to carrying out our
beneficent purposes in some underdeveloped nations is their lack
of a corps of instrumentalists performing the kind of function that
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we have relied on lawyers to perform. If that diagnosis is right, the
reform of legal education may become an important goal of social
policy in such countries.
For our own society, however, there seems to be no pressing
issue about how much of this sort of talent we need to provide. In
this role the lawyer's contribution is primarily economic and productive. The rewards he earns are as good a measure as any of his
value to society, and we can be reasonably confident that those rewards will maintain a supply of the lawyer's skill that matches its
social utility.
The same thing cannot be said, I think, as to the second sphere
of the lawyer's activities that I wish to discuss, although it is one
that obviously intersects with and overlaps the first. I shall call
this the protective function. Along with other occupations such as
doctors, safety engineers and insurance salesmen, lawyers have an
important contribution to make in ameliorating the risks of life. I
am speaking, of course, of what in more familiar terms we think
of as the counseling function, and I have in mind the provocative question put by a thoughtful lawyer, Charles P. Curtis, who
wondered whether there is any occasion when a man would not be
better off for having a lawyer at his side. To describe the function
as avoidance of risk is perhaps too narrow. A man turns to his
lawyer not only to foresee the risks but to help him decide which
risks to run. In this light it is the function of helping people avoid
mistakes.
This aspect of the lawyer's function has given rise to some
major current questions. They arise not because of doubts about
the lawyer's potential value but precisely because of our confidence
in his value, perhaps even more confidence than is justified. We
have begun to recognize that the protective function of the lawyer
may have value for all classes and conditions of society, not merely
those with economic interests commensurate with the costs of the
service and resources commensurate with their price. We are moving toward the view that some level of legal service should be
made available to all citizens, like public education and medical
care. Such a goal confronts us with a series of questions that for
the legal profession are novel-questions of definition of the nature
and level of services to be provided, questions of organization of
the profession, questions of recruitment of the right men to engage
in such work, questions of their education. That we should have
been stimulated to pursue such questions is surely one of the most
useful results of the War on Poverty. Legal services as such can
hardly improve the economic condition of masses of men, but they
can do something to give men, whatever their economic status, a
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greater measure of control over their lives and a greater sense that
the rules of society recognize the interests of the poor as well as
the comfortable.
The lawyer's competence to counsel the average person on personal and family matters has undoubtedly been neglected in legal
education, and there is reason to doubt that for most lawyers the
neglect has been repaired by experience. The new focus on legal
problems of the indigent may set us on the way to creating or reviving a type of professional adviser analogous to the vanishing
family doctor, or it may lead to new types of agency combining the
services of different kinds of specialists. In any event it seems clear
that in this sphere the potential future of the lawyer is an expanding
one. Intelligent response to these emerging needs will cause society
to place an even greater value on the lawyer's protective role.
A third sphere of the lawyer in society is the sphere of conflict.
It is in this sphere that the role of the lawyer is not only most
visible but most clearly indispensable. We can hardly imagine a
society without conflict. The lawyer, and the whole machinery of
justice for which he is primarily responsible, are charged with
maximizing the social interest in tranquility by providing means
for the rational settlement of disputes. This is perhaps the highest
sense in which lawyers as a group have the responsibility for reducing the arbitrary factors in our social life. Their function is not
primarily to resist great political forces, the aspect of their role in
society which drew De Tocqueville's attention, but to help remove
the frictions and inequities and arbitrary consequences that are produced by the working out of the larger forces.
But here, in contrast to the lawyer's advisory or protective
function, there are some perplexities in deciding how much of this
kind of service is a good thing. Is the good society a litigious society or one which minimizes the occasions for litigation? Do we
aspire to a society in which the need for lawyers in such a role is
withering away, or to one in which the barrister flourishes because
he is needed and there are resources to pay for his services?
We seem always to have had a somewhat ambivalent attitude
toward litigation. One facet of it is the fact that the courtroom
advocate has long represented a kind of ideal image of the profession; the barrister's function, performed at its best, has had greater
prestige than the solicitor's. Again, the idea that the vindication of
a man's rights in court is one of the hallmarks of liberty has occupied a high place in our scheme of things. But on the other hand
there is a strong strain of doctrine hostile to litigation, both in the
common law and in the ethical standards of the bar. Courts have
worried or have professed to worry about whether the adoption of
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this rule or that would tend to breed lawsuits and flood the courts
with business. Lawyers are supposed to avoid various kinds of
activity that smack of stirring up litigation.
The question is difficult because of the fact that conflict in society is an ambiguous symptom. It points to the presence of stresses
and dissatisfactions, and thus suggests illness; it is also in a sense a
wasteful diversion of energies. But at the same time it suggests the
absence of repression, the airing of grievances, the existence of
channels of resolution. In this sense it may be productive and it
may be a symptom of fundamental health in the society.
One side of the problem has recently come to seem relatively
clear in principle. Viewing the lawyer as a shield, an aid to the
defending party to a dispute, we have no difficulty in saying that
our society would be better off if it had more of this kind of resource. We have indeed adopted as a legal principle that in criminal
cases the defendant must be provided with counsel if he wishes it,
regardless of his ability to pay. There appears no good reason of
policy why we should not wish to extend the same principle to civil
matters. The obstacles, I take it, are almost entirely in the realm
of economics.
But the lawyer is not merely a shield in conflicts. He is also a
champion. Would our society be better off if every man had at his
beck and call a skilled champion for every cause in which he might
plausibly claim the support of official force? Perhaps the answer
should be reasonably clear here, too, apart from the difficult economic problems. If it is not yet as clear, however, I suggest it is
in part because of our ambivalence toward the value of conflict.
The problem is made more difficult by the fact that the skillful,
imaginative lawyer is himself a potent source of causes to champion. Many rights, many grievances that might be turned into
rights, lie dormant simply because no lawyer has been turned loose
to root them out, explore their foundations, and shape them into
valid causes of action.
What is our attitude toward maximizing the role of conflict and
conflict-resolution in our society? There are signs of a basic shift.
We have created and are still developing important procedural devices such as the declaratory judgment and the class action which
open still wider the potential field of legal conflict. Legal rules
that inhibit organized effort to initiate litigation have recently
been modified by new constitutional doctrine. The potential role
of legal aid agencies in conducting test cases to establish new
rights and remedies for classes of indigent clients is under serious
discussion. These are some of the symptoms of an underlying issue
that we must continue to explore as part of any effort to arrive at
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a comprehensive view of the contemporary role of the lawyer in a
good society.
I come, finally, to what may be the highest as well as the
most difficult aspect of the lawyer's role in society. It is also the
least tangible, and for that reason it is the one that is closest to
what I think De Tocqueville was talking about. I shall call this the
sphere of civic wisdom. We have no conventional term to describe
the lawyer's role in this sphere. Perhaps it will suffice if we think
of him as the practicing political philosopher, or, more simply, as
educator. I am thinking of the public side of a lawyer's life and it
includes, of course, all that he does as a volunteer in worthy civic
enterprises; it includes the wide and expanding activities he engages in as a member of the organized bar and as participant
in law-reform enterprises such as bar association committees, the
American Law Institute, the President's commission of lawyers
on civil rights problems, and the like. It includes lawyers as politicians, legislators, and public servants. All these represent important
ways in which lawyers have contributed to the fabric and the
quality of American life, and I do not underestimate the magnitude
and value of the contribution. But I am thinking of something
broader still, and I wish to suggest some doubts about whether in
this broader sense lawyers have yet achieved the influence we
might wish them to have.
Let me remind you of one of the things De Tocqueville said
about the attributes of lawyers that qualify them for a special influence in public affairs. "Men who have made a special study of
the laws," he said, "derive from occupation certain habits of order,
a taste for formalities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the
regular connection of ideas, which naturally render them very
hostile to the revolutionary spirit and the unreflecting passions of
the multitude." I believe he was correct about the tendency of law
study to cultivate these qualities, but it seems to me there is a
larger and in a sense more positive end they may serve than hostility to the revolutionary spirit and to the so-called passions of the
multitude. One might add certain qualities that De Tocqueville
failed to mention-among them, skepticism, independence of outlook (a quality that de Tocqueville did suggest, I suppose, when
he referred to the lawyer's having "a certain contempt for the
judgment of the multitude"), insistence upon knowing the facts, an
accumulation of experience with all the manifold practical problems of human organization, a taste for rigorous analysis, and respect for theories.
It could be argued that lawyers have functioned superbly well
in this role with respect to one large segment of our law. I mean,

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. so

of course, the body of judge-made law and the growing body of
statutory law in technical fields that modifies or substitutes for
judge-made law. In this field, in which the law is more or less directly the responsibility of lawyers and within their control, American lawyers have really disproved De Tocqueville's assertion that
"lawyers are disinclined to innovate when they are left to their own
choice." On the contrary they have shown great capacity for change
and reform.
But the great shift in law since De Tocqueville's time has been
the enormous growth of legislative law and the expansion of law
to cover vast fields of activity largely unregulated by law in his day.
It is a fair question whether the special capacities of lawyers have
had their proper influence in this sphere, or have had much to do
with shaping the character and direction of what is now the more
important part of our legal system. Let me suggest two general
issues that are relevant to this development. We have witnessed
an immense growth in resort to regulatory systems and to the use
of the administrative agency in carrying out the felt needs of the
time. It is always a question whether a given public purpose should
be carried out by such techniques or whether the alternative route
of creating private rights of action, relying on individual initiative
to enforce such rights, should be used. There is always, too, the
question whether the field is one which law should occupy at all.
How much ought we to expect, for example, from putting warning
notices on packages of cigarettes? Are these not issues on which
lawyers should have professional knowledge and professional views?
If so, what are they and how are they to be brought to bear on
the decisions of society? Again, we have witnessed enormous
changes in the allocation of power in our system. The proper structure of political power would seem to be pre-eminently a question
for lawyers' analysis. Do we as lawyers have any theories? Do we
have anything to say about the values of federalism in general or
about the wisdom of preserving or abandoning it in particular
fields? If so, how are these views to be made influential?
Of course I do not really know what lawyers should be able to
contribute to public understanding on such issues as these, and
many others that might be mentioned. In part we suffer from a
great lack of knowledge of how laws work and what they accomplish. But we also suffer from lack of obvious means by which
lawyers can analyze such issues for the education of the people.
We have to a large extent surrendered our influence on public affairs to newspaper columnists, editorial writers, television producers, and assorted pundits. Perhaps this is inevitable. I find myself as unable as was De Tocqueville to say precisely how the wis-
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dom of lawyers, if we had more wisdom, could be made more influential than it is. But I do suggest that a necessary condition for
the fulfillment of a spacious role for the lawyer in society is that
the lawyer must first of all have a theory about society, a view of
where we ought to be going and how law can modify our course in
the proper ways.
De Tocqueville had a view of the good society, and he believed
in the usefulness of knowledge and education in directing us toward
it. That was why he wrote his book. In that fact lies the chief
significance of De Tocqueville's commentary for our own times. The
highest role of lawyers in our society is more likely to be realized
if we take seriously the problems of statecraft that interested De
Tocqueville.

